Scientific and Technical Communication: Theory, Practice and Policy

A Brief History of Presidential Science Policy

Toward the end of World War II, President Roosevelt asked Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development to give a list of recommendations for continuing and strengthening the cooperation between government, science and technology. The irony of the war (like those before it) was that it served as catalyst for extraordinary scientific and technological development. World War II saw the establishment of national laboratories (like Oak Ridge and Los Alamos), the development of radar, sonar and the atomic bomb, and the discovery of number of life saving drugs. Roosevelt wanted a method by which the government could harness and stimulate the growth of post-war science and technology. The memory of the depression still haunted most people, and science and technology appeared to provide a stable economic base on which to build the economy. As a future consequence of Bush's report, the federal government, through a range of agencies (Bush wanted a single National Science Foundation to handle all science funding), assumed the dominant role for funding basic scientific research in the university. The peer review system was established to review grant proposals from individual researchers and teams of researchers.

Science and technology policy during the 1950's was a direct response to the cold-war threat of the emerging Soviet empire. The break out of the Korean War saw the renewed involvement of scientists in the military, especially the Air Force. By 1950 the Office of Naval Research has established over 1,200 research contracts with approximately 200 universities. Emphasis was placed on research in high energy physics, and research universities began to depend on the flow of federal dollars. The increase in Naval research coincided with the Admiral Hyman Rickover's development of the nuclear navy. The navy launched the atomically powered submarine Nautilus in 1955. Field tests of the Nautilus were so impressive that Rickover achieved national prominence and a reputation for being dictatorial in his meticulous attention to detail. Rickover's accomplishments came in the midst of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" campaign begun in 1953. Eisenhower thought that nuclear power could be harnessed for peaceful purposes, and encouraged engineers to design a nuclear reactor to produce energy for civilian use. Eisenhower enlisted Rickover to head the project. The urgency of Eisenhower's desire to build and export civilian reactors to Europe was symbolized by Rickover's appointment as director of the project, and the real possibility that the Soviet Union would enter the market first. Toward the end of the decade, however, the military became disenchanted with scientific research. Funding for the Pentagon faced renewed scrutiny and in 1957 the Department of Defense announced that it was cutting its research budget by 10%. A shock wave was set of the scientific research community. Fortunately for research scientists, the Soviet Union intervened.

On October 4, 1957 the Soviet Union launched the first Sputnik. Fear that the Soviet's would control the sky above the United States (this fear was revived in the 1980's) touched off a renewed round of Department of Defense spending on scientific research. The space race had begun. John Kennedy's election in 1960, and his promise to have a man on the moon by the end of the decade is perhaps the most clearest example of priority-setting in science and technology policy. Scientific research and development in the decade of the 1960's, through increased funding for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), included planetary probes, satellites and the pursuit of manned space flight. National research and development expenditures continued to rise from approximately $17 billion dollars in 1960 to approximately $30 billion dollars in 1969 (expressed in 1972 dollars). The Johnson administration, while continuing to fund defense and space research, trained the attention of science and technology on Great Society programs. Research was encouraged in the areas of personal health, pollution and transportation systems to demonstrate that social desirable ends could be reached through science and technology. Johnson's attitudes toward research were indirectly quoted by one scientist who heard him suggest that scientists had done enough basic research and it was now time to work on its application.

The Apollo program symbolized one the great irony of successful, goal-directed policymaking. Scientists and engineers met Kennedy's challenge, and the country stood united in awe of the achievement. But the expectations of Congress were raised; now the people wanted to see immediate, timely return on their investments in science and technology. Similarly, the success of the Apollo program found a number of scientists and engineers out of a job, and left NASA scientists pondering how, or if, they could follow the act of putting men on the moon.

With the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962, Ralph Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed in 1965, and Alvin Toffler's Future Shock in 1970, the national debate over the relation among the values of science, technology and society shifted and intensified. Science and technology, once presented to popular culture as society's benefactors, were now posed as threats. The threat of DDT and the Corvair automobile as documented by Carson and Nader sparked the beginning of the environmental and consumer movements. Toffler's best-seller found the impact of science and technology on society problematic in echoing the warning of C.P. Snow's 1959 Rede Lecture that a dangerous and widening gulf had emerged between the education and aims of scientists and humanists. The tone of much of the literature of the 1960's and early 1970's was anti- science and technology. Interdisciplinary programs began at several universities to educate science and engineering students about the social impact of their work, and the values expressed in science and technology. Many of these efforts were initially reactionary, fueled by growing protests against the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, impassioned critiques against the social consequences of scientific and technological development continued to have their effect. Basic research performed by industry (in industrial labs for example) fell approximately 37% between 1966 and 1972. Like Congress, industry wanted short-term results that promised a return on investment.

As funding for the Vietnam War and the space program were scaled back, research into energy efficiency and alternatives received a boost. In sum, however, funding for basic research began to level off in 1970 and stagnate until 1975. President Nixon's personal antagonism toward science (and protesting academics generally) led him to abolish the post of presidential science advisor and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Nixon also placed control of the Office of Science Policy under the aegis of the National Science Foundation. Scientists took up the task of making the case for the relevance of their research programs and prepared for greater public participation in their projects.

From 1973 to 1974, the economy stalled. Locked in an economic recession that witnessed the advent of government mandated price freezes, economists saw investment in science and technology as a way of contributing to economic growth. Technological change and scientific research, according these economic models, provided the economy with a new products which in turn created new markets. Science-based industries, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, microelectronics, were seen as keys to United States trade, and investments in science and technology facilitated the growth of "intellectual capital." The shift in thinking in the White House during the Ford and Carter administration from spending on (government overhead) to investing in (promise of return) science and technology invigorated the scientific community. Semantically, science and technology were now couched in economic terms. The growth and production of knowledge required capital and careful investment planning. Long-term financial commitment had to be made in order to insure yields. Controlling knowledge meant controlling markets. The business of American was the business of science and technology.

In 1975, the scientific community realized it had a friend in Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller proposed that Congress reestablish the Office of Science Policy (later named the Office of Science and Technology Policy) and sought to bring industrial and scientific leaders back into the White House. President Ford requested the formation of two expert advisory panels for science and technology policy. On the panels sat senior executives from General Electric, Texas Instruments and IBM as well as scientists from the leading universities Stanford, Princeton and MIT. By the end of the Ford administration, spending for basic research increased approximately 2%.

President Carter endorsed the trend toward the growth of science and technology, but sent mixed messages to corporations by his commitments to the environment, labor and conservation. Carter appeared to be holding up the banner of unfettered research in science and technology in on hand, while reaching out to the groups who benefited from the Great Society programs with the other hand. These groups demanded an equitable distribution of funds, and once again called for explanations of the relevance of certain research programs. While the social relevance of alternative energy research was obvious, Carter's science advisor Frank Press called for the government to balance its budgetary research commitments with private capital. From Press' perspective, the government should only help a research project until it became somewhat self-sustaining, then private corporations would assume control. In attempting to strike a balance between private and government sponsorship of science and technology, Carter's policy initiatives were captive to policymakers representing either the interests of corporations or the interests of the people.

Declared by many as the era of "economic recovery," the Reagan years were marked by a shift away from applied science (e.g., solar power, private sector research) to basic research (e.g., defense, public sector research). Consequently, cuts were made in applied energy research and agricultural sciences. The Reagan administration encouraged the dominant role of the private sector in funding applied scientific research; while the emphasis in basic research included advanced computers and biotechnology. A strict line was drawn between private and public sector interests. Science and technology were to be controlled as much as possible by the free market, and public money was reserved to "provide for the common defense." As the Reagan years unfolded, big-science research projects turned up on the agenda. The proposed funding of the Superconducting Super Collider, the Space Station, the Human Genome Project, AIDS research and the Strategic Defense Initiative was reminiscent of big-science, long term projects of the early 1960's. During the 1980's the dependence of the world economy on science and technology became obvious, just as the outcome of big-science projects became dubious.

National science policy, as influenced by the President, appears cyclical. The pet projects of one administration die with the election of the next President, only to be reborn a decade later. As this chapter is being written, Congress has stopped funding for the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), the project is effectively dead, for now. If the patterns of previous executive policymaking hold, however, we can speculate that the issues surrounding the SSC will be revisited by a future President seeking advice from a number of sources, including the appointed science advisor.

The Science Advisor

The legacy of Vannevar Bush, in establishing the framework for funding of science and technology during the Roosevelt administration, was to establish the dominant role federal government exercises in influencing university scientific research. Bush set precedent not only for current policymakers wrestle with, but demonstrated the need for the President, who may have no extensive training in science and technology, to have a science advisor. Still, Bush's appointment as science advisor was informal and James Killian became the first titled Science Advisor in 1958 under President Eisenhower. Interestingly, Killian proved an initial exception to the developing trend of appointing physicists to the position. A trained humanist, Killian rose to an administrative position at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and in the process gained acceptance in the scientific community.

Aside from being a presidential appointee, the Science Advisor, after passage of the Office of Science and Technology Policy Act in 1976, is the director of the OSTP. The OSTP is a relatively small department consisting of approximately 70 staff members. The OSTP provides information on various aspects of science and technology for the President, comments of proposals, coordinates inter-agency policy, and acts as a conduit between the executive branch and scientific and technical communities. Senior staff members stay on the job usually no longer than the Science Advisor, so each time a Presidential administration changes a new staff is assembled. The Science Advisor also chairs PCAST. Created in 1989, the President's Council of Advisors in Science and Technology (PCAST) consists of members appointed by the President from academia, engineering, industry and science. Through PCAST and OSTP the Science Advisor exerts persuasive influence over the President, but little else. Much of the effectiveness of the Science Advisor rests on a personal relationship with the President.

Members of the larger science community, as well as the general public, have questioned the role of the science advisor, as ideological cheerleader and as a scientific expert giving advice about issues in other sciences and technology with which they are unfamiliar. One of the most common complaints about the science advisor is that he is a almost always a physicist, albeit extraordinarily credentialed. Accordingly, one complaint is that the input of the other natural and social sciences has not been fairly represented, or funded. Physics, often portrayed as the dominant science discipline, represents only one model of how scientific research can be effectively conducted. Critics complain that aspects of the physics model, its organization, methods and history of progress, have been unreasonably translated into policymaking standards for all sciences. And as one critic has noted, what the President really needs advice on is not the conduct of science per se, but how the government can support the growth and use of technology.

While the science advisor comes predominantly out of one discipline, the appointment has not been seen as politically motivated. However, Ronald Reagan's advisor George Keyworth broke with tradition in openly promoting the distinction between the public and private concerns of science and technology policy. While policy had previously been directed toward promoting "national well-being," Keyworth seized the opportunity to blur the line between "well-being" and defense. Keyworth's strategy became evident in his open promotion of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The opinions of scientists who had doubts about SDI were not always passed on to the President. Consequently, disgruntled OSTP staff members quit. The White House staff also became displeased with Keyworth outspokenness, and took the opportunity to call for the abolishment of OSTP. However, Keyworth resigned in 1985 and was replaced by a the deputy administrator of NASA, William Graham, an electrical engineer.

The influence of science advisors is constrained by the system within the White House, and the President's own initiatives. Science advisors may be viewed skeptically, or cut out of the process altogether. Nevertheless, even though the science advisor's power is limited, it is not apolitical. Science advisor's must wrestle with their own advocacy of science and technology, the President's ideology, and the function of other Federal agencies.

OMB and Beyond

Budget controls policy. The budget for scientific research is assembled by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB analyzes the budgets of all Federal agencies before they are submitted to Congress, with emphasis on programs of interest to the President. Some of the criteria looked at in investing in research are prestige, spin-off applications and technologies, and national security implications. OMB sets goals for funding taking into account the needs of other federal agencies given the discretion of budget examiners located in several government divisions. Working with specific agency budget makers, members of the OMB negotiate fiscal allocation, priority setting and research funding. Budget negotiation takes place behind the scenes and is not subject to public deliberation. OMB has played a prominent role in setting the financial agenda for big-science projects. Since 1991, caps have been placed on discretionary spending for defense, domestic and international spending. Consequently, the power of OMB lies in negotiating within the executive branch how money is allocated among specific programs. 13

Several independent groups provide a link between the scientific and engineering community and the executive branch. The members of the National Academy of Sciences, for instance, are solicited to provide reports on issues about science and technology, as well as serve on panels and commissions. Other groups exerting influence of the executive branch include the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine. Lobbying groups also exert considerable, yet not unquestioned, influence on Federal science and technology policy. As of 1989 there were an estimated 6,000 public and special interest groups. Although lobbying groups are usually associated with legislative decisionmaking, the agriculture and energy lobbies have an important role in directing policy.

The centralized authority of the president allows for a distinct advantage over Congress in setting research and funding priorities. Although agencies such as the Office of Technology Assessment and Congressional Budget Office provide Congress with invaluable policymaking resources, the fate of the research dollar rests with the Office of Management and Budget. Perhaps the most striking characteristics about the process of executive science and technology policymaking is that it is largely undemocratic, often relying on internal party politics and the advice of well-qualified, but ideologically connected experts. 14

The Legislative Branch

In opposition to the centralized authority in the executive branch, Congress chooses to decentralize the authority of the policymaking process. Approximately 150 of the 303 committees and subcommittees of Congress (as of 1991) have some jurisdiction over research. In the 101st Congress the House has 22 committees and 146 subcommittees, the Senate had 16 committees and 87 subcommittees. There were 9 select committees, with 11 subcommittees, and 4 joint committees, with 8 subcommittees. Significant committees and with legislative jurisdiction over research include Public Works and Transportation and Space, Science and Technology in the House and Labor and Human Resources and Commerce, Science and Transportation in the Senate. Through their longevity, many of these committees have become permanent fixtures by carving out their own turf. As you can see, given the number of committees and subcommittees, policy development in science and technology can be slowed by debate concerning who has control over what issue. Still the people selected to chair these committees have the opportunity to exert long-term influence over the development of certain programs.

Just as the case with most presidents, most representatives have little or no training in the sciences and technology. Through support agencies such as the Science Policy Research Division (SPRD) and the Technology Assessment Board (TAB), which governs the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Congress has attempted to improve its access to the scientific and technological community. Founded in 1972, the OTA's mission is to assess the impact of technology such as coal-slurry pipelines and rural communications systems by producing reports, giving oral briefings and issuing memoranda. The importance of OTA has increased over the years as indicated in 1985 when Congress transferred $700,000 from the National Academy of Sciences to OTA to study the Strategic Defense Initiative. OTA has also studied mine reclamation, nuclear waste disposal, and retraining workers displaced by technology. Aside from support agencies, Congress has several means of affecting science and technology policy including appropriations, earmarking legislation and public hearings.

Appropriations

Through the appropriation process, Congress possesses its most powerful means for science and technology policy. The appropriations process consists of two stages, program authorization and appropriation. Authorizing committees report on programs under their jurisdiction and set sending caps for the maximum amount of money spent on a particular program. These committees are most effective when new agencies are created, and when authorizing funds to initiate, upgrade or end a program. Authorization bills are used to oversee how, and on what programs government agencies spend money.

Once the President's budget reaches Congress the President's budget it is met by resolutions of committees in both houses that set spending limits in certain areas. Appropriations bills control the spending of authorized funds for programs. Consequently, authorized money cannot be spent unless it is also appropriated. For example, in 1980 The Magnetic Fusions Energy Engineering Act authorized $20 billion for research and development on magnetic fusion over the next twenty years. However, the money was not appropriated by the House Committee on Appropriations (and its 13 subcommittees) so that actual expenditures for the program dropped to about $330 million in 1986. 15 In some instances agencies effected by the President's budget receive more budget authority than originally proposed. As a result, appropriations committees try to modify the authorizing to "earmark" more funds for special projects.

Earmarking

Historically the term "earmark" comes from the practice of cutting off pigs' ears before the animals were sent to graze in a common area. The owner could get credit, or a "mark", for a stolen or slaughtered pigs by producing their ears'. Today the term refers to the direct appropriation of funds for a project by Congress. The earmarking process, although not wide-spread, is a tradition within the legislative branch. Powerful legislators can bring home the federal bacon (or "pork") in supporting local project such as roadways or a sewage treatment plant. More recently, "earmarking" has made its way into the academic arena in the funding of scientific research.

The Office of Technology assessment defines a congressional earmark: " ... as a project, facility, instrument, or other academic research-related expense that is directly funded by Congress, which has not been subjected to peer review and will not be competitively awarded." 16 One of the largest beneficiaries of earmarked funds according to this definition (among others) was the Soybean Laboratory at the University of Illinois-Urbana. Other definitions of earmarking have been used within Congress to procure or deny procurement of funds by legislators. The earmarking process has special significance within the scientific community because it violates one of the defining characteristics of scientific funding, merit.

Proponents of earmarking point to the fact that respected research has been produced by this practice. Also, earmarking serves to provide a form of equity between research universities that "have", the major land-grant or research universities, and other academic institutions that "have not", historically African-American universities for example. Proponents of earmarking note that the peer review system is thoroughly biased, it perpetuates the cycle of the rich getting richer. As a partial result, diverse views and backgrounds are treated as incidental to the process of science. Moreover, funds are distributed inequitably even by region.

Each major geographical region has a number of institutions that should be able to compete on equal terms for funds, therefore distributing centers of research excellence throughout the country. However, 40 percent of earmarked funds went to just five states, including Massachusetts, New York and Florida, and two-thirds of the rest of the states received less than 10 percent of earmarked funds, including Virginia, Nebraska and Missouri. Additionally, from 1980-1989, 20 academic institutions universities received 60 percent of the total earmarks, including Stanford University, MIT and the University of Washington. 17

The scientific community has always held up that the merit of a research project, as determined through the peer review system, should be the primary basis for awarding federal funds. While the peer review system itself has come under heavy criticism, earmarking is seen as an even more direct assault of the equitable funding of scientific research. Opponents of earmarking point to the fact that projects worthy of funding do not receive a fair hearing when funds are directly appropriated. All research proposal should be treated the same way, and all proposals should be subject to peer review. Since the Federal Government faces the impossible task of equitably distributing funds to the nation's 3,400 colleges and universities, 1,300 of which award science and engineering degrees, agencies should use results as the primary criteria for awarding funds. The top 100 institutions commanding the largest share of overall Federal funding produce most of the Ph.D.'s in science and engineering. 18 Thus, opponents of earmarking argue, research funding awarded competitively yields results that benefit the entire nation.

Since the history of academic earmarking is short, a thorough analysis of the effect of earmarked funds on scientific research has yet to be completed. The concern over congressional earmarking may be misplaced if earmarked project are found to have an equal or greater impact on scientific research (given specific criteria) as projects funded through peer review programs. On the other hand, if earmarked programs are found to be inferior, a change in the funding system is in order.

Legislation

The primary function of Congress is to make and enact laws. The complexity of science and technology, however, can make the writing of specific legislation nearly impossible. As a result, laws and regulations pertaining to science and technology either suffer from being too general, as phrases like the "best available option" indicate, or too specific, as Vice-President Gore pointed out by displaying pages of specifications for making ash trays for government use. Science and technology present unique legislative problems not only through their social complexity, but through their rapid change. Scientific discoveries and technological innovations routinely outpace the legislation meant to regulate them. Further, as science and technology extend throughout the market place, so do the uses and effects for particular products. A suggested approach to legislative decision making about science and technology is to do so "scientifically", through cost-benefit analyses. While cost-benefit analyses offer some general guidance in policymaking, calculations can be wildly off the mark. Rarely do complex political and social decisions fit into neat scientific calculation. Lawmakers then must wrestle with the unintended consequences of regulating particular industries and technologies, a task only as difficult as predicting the future.

In 1970 Congress passed, and President Nixon signed, the Occupational Health and Safety Act to insure the protection of workers. The law also created the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). Previous labor struggles by coal miners and autoworkers demanding cleaner working conditions inspired the legislation which in principle gave workers the right to participate in decisions about the conditions in which they worked. Rank-and-file union members found legal support for their position and began to press for greater control over technological decisions. The corporate community worried that decision over which technologies could be used legally by particular industries would rest exclusively in the hands of the state. Corporate rhetoric heralded the end of democracy and the end of private enterprise smothered by government regulation. Labor and environmental groups heralded the dawn of a new democratic era in which workers and interest groups could actively participate in making employers socially responsibility. Regulations, business owners complained, weakened the entrepreneurial spirit vital for industry and the costs of compliance would drive some industries out of business. Throughout the 1970's, the battle over regulating industry and technology was waged on a number of fronts. The language of the legislation was legally attacked by the textile industry in 1978. The industry claimed the new regulations were unduly burdensome because the cost of compliance had not been fully considered by Congress. In 1981, after a series of lower court rulings, the Supreme Court turned back the textile industries challenge by holding that Congress did not intend that regulations were meant only for the companies that could afford them. Economic considerations were to be excluded from worker safety considerations.

In the early 1970's the chemical industry through a cost-benefit analysis predicted the costs of $65 to $90 billion to meet regulations the exposure of workers to polyvinyl chloride (PVC). Essentially the chemical industry would be forced into wholesale bankruptcy. However, the chemical industry eventually found innovative ways to meet the standards and was encouraged by the government to invest in new plants and technology. The eventual cost of the regulations was less that $1 billion. 19

Public Hearings

By holding public hearings and investigations, the Congress can substantially affect the direction of science and technology policy without legislation. While bills are drafted to meet narrowly defined issues, public hearings can have broad implications for policy. Hearings do mobilize interest groups to lobby certain agencies and raise voter awareness on specific issues. Public hearings also offer a chance to see "democracy in action" and provide a glimpse into what happens when the worlds of science, technology and politics collide.

From February 26, 1986 to May 2, 1986 a Presidential Commission appointed by President Reagan and chaired by William Rogers met to determine the cause of the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger. The Challenger disaster profoundly impacted the American consciousness and raised questions about the affect of political expediency on science and technology policy. The following exchange is taken from the transcript of the proceedings that took place on February 26, 1986. "Mr. Hardy" is George Hardy, then the deputy director of science and engineering at the Marshall Space Flight Center for NASA. "Chairman Rogers" is William Rogers, then the presiding chair of the committee. "Mr. Mulloy" mentioned in the testimony is Larry Mulloy, then manager of the space shuttle solid rocket booster program at Marshall Space Flight Center. He is giving testimony concurrently.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: Not being an engineer, and because I am surrounded by so many capable engineers, I would like to ask a question that is not an engineering question. At some point, I gather, you have to, you will agree that the colder the weather the greater the risk. Is that accurate?

MR. HARDY: I am not sure that is an accurate statement. I would say, and again, I am going to look at that question from the other side of 51-L. (the Challenger launch)

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But I mean at the moment you are inclined to say it doesn't make any difference how cold it get as far as the risk is concerned on the O-Rings?

MR. HARDY: At the moment I would say that the consideration of the effect of temperature on the joint is certainly an active failure analysis, and there are some features of the joint, indeed, where temperature can affect it.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: But that's a key question, it seems to me, because if you in the back of your mind, in the back of Mr. Mulloy's mind you said it really doesn't make any difference how cold it gets as far as the joint in concerned.

MR. HARDY: No, sir, I don't believe I said that.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No. I am asking now do you think that at some point the coldness of the weather makes a difference on the risk?

MR. HARDY: Well, I am sure there must be some point because there is some point at which the structural integrity of the O-rings just wouldn't be maintained.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: At what point would that be?

MR. HARDY: I think that would be somewhere in the minus 40, minus 50 range.

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: So insofar as you are concerned now, it wouldn't make any difference about the risk in connection with the joints if it was above 40 below? In other words, I am trying to see what you thought process was. I think most people, or a lot of people have felt that the worse the weather, the more the risk insofar as these joints are concerned, and I guess you are saying you don't agree with that.

MR. HARDY: Well, I think probably there might be dozens and dozens of things on the vehicle that one could say-

CHAIRMAN ROGERS: No, I am talking about the O-rings now and the joints.

MR. HARDY: I could not in my mind quantify any increased risk-let me make sure I say that correctly. I could not in my mind determine that there was any increased risk to safety as a result of the temperature that we were discussing on the night of the 27th. 20

The testimony given in the investigation of the Challenger accident would change policy regarding space exploration forever. NASA, for example, had planned to deploy the Hubble Space Telescope in October 1986. That plan was delayed until April 1990, at which time it was discovered the $1.5 billion telescope had problems with its mirrors making the images it sent back no clearer than those of ground telescopes. The public has grown impatient with huge investments of public money that yield failed results. It seemed fantastic that cold weather could cause a sophisticated piece of technology like the shuttle to fail. As Hardy responds in his testimony, perhaps "dozens" of factors could have been responsible. Rogers assumes a populist persona, deferring to the expertise of the engineers in the room, while persistently looking for a single, understandable explanation. In so doing, he asks the same question several ways, always coming back to the problem of temperature. Hardy counters that thinking about risk, and temperature cannot be quantified, and the technology while dependable is, after all, complicated. This section of testimony defines many of the questions faced by policymakers, the lay public and scientists and engineers. Should policymaking regarding science and technology be a democratic process? Can an informed lay public who are not trained scientists and technologists scrutinize and evaluate science and technology? Should the conduct of science and technology be changed? What kind of communicative possibilities exist among speakers from divergent backgrounds?

An Overall Picture

The executive and legislative branches of government have separate roles in the policymaking process based on principle obligations and responsibilities under law, and the shifting nature of scientific and technological research and development. The social, political and institutional complexity of science, technology and the federal government often make long-term policy making difficult. Even big-science projects are not assure of surviving the changing winds of government funding. Each agency in the executive and legislative branches possesses its own turf and power over a process that is as cyclical as the election of each new administration. OMB oversees fiscal issues; OSTP coordinates information on which the President makes decisions. The budgets for science and technology are nested within larger budgets, and these budgets are considered by specific agencies without any sense of the overall health of the funding process of governing science and technology.

In the confusion and questions surrounding the local and national politics that effect science and technology policy, where do you fit in? Some of you will become scientists and engineers, some of you will pursue other careers, and some of you will compete for funding, authority and prestige, but all of you are implicated in a common fate. And while all of you will not agree about matters of policy, you can set standards in which the various and often contradictory skills and ideas you possess lead to quite different goals. Policy decisions regarding science and technology have been cast as winner take all propositions in which opposing interests (the chemical industry versus the government regulators) require that one side succeed at the expense of the other. This type of thinking has been perpetuated by the idea that parties on the opposite side of an issue remain steadfast in their positions. Although communication will not led to consensus, it will lead to providing ways in which different goals can be harmoniously pursued.

In the first half of this century, courses in "civics" were taught in American public schools. One aim of these courses was to instruct students how democratic government worked, what their obligations were, and what political mechanisms were at their disposal. Today we call civic participation and responsibility "empowerment." However, with respect to science and technology policy, we feel powerless. Science education is wonderful at distributing facts and figures. And as members of a technological society, we enjoy the fruits of the labor of scientific research and technological advancement. But we do nothing to influence the direction science and technology will take.

Scientific and technical communicators inherit a unique perspective and position in helping to mediate among various levels of expertise and interest. By studying and using scientific and technical communication in various contexts, one can engage in public debate concerning policy on both national and local levels. The biggest stumbling block to the formation of coherent policies on science and technology has been miscommunication and lack of access to information. An "exchange language" for ideas among people with different interests and professional backgrounds can be created by integrating various sources on science and technology (academic, journalistic, private) in professional communicative practices, and in the policy arena.

Discussion

1. Technology is often defined as "applied science." Given this definition, science, and scientific advancement, is the fundamental engine of the modern progress: all technology, then, owes its existence to the development of scientific theories. How would you define "technology"? How do you define the relationship between science and technology? Can you think of any examples in which a technological invention or advance came before, or led to, the development of a scientific theory?

2. In what ways has technology redefined what you consider "personal" or "private"? How have you used technology to find out information about another person with, or without, their consent? How have technologies redefined concepts such as gender, sexuality, intelligence, health and beauty with which define ourselves? How will technology continue to redefine those concepts? Can you think of other concepts technology has essentially redefined that influence you?

3. How do you see the relationship between women, men and technology portrayed in our society? Which technologies carry with them the attributes of masculinity of femininity? In science and technology, how does the race or gender composition of a particular discipline or profession (e.g., the medical profesion) influence the selection of problems and projects?

Exercises

Assemble into groups of three or four members. For the group's final project provide an analysis of a scientific or technological controversy. A scientific of technological controversy involves a dispute among individuals and/or members of a group about the value of a research project, implementation of a government policy, or development of a technology. The contexts for the dispute can be wide ranging, economic, political, environmental, methodological, philosophical, historical and statistical. During a scientific and technological controversy, many basic assumptions that we hold, regarding, for example, clear communication, what counts as evidence and knowledge and boundaries between public and private interests, come under scrutiny. The purpose of this assignment is to have you examine, from both a practitioner's and a layperson's perspective, the roles science and technology play in public discourse.

Contemporary controversies often appear in The New York Review of Books, The Times Higher Education Supplement, Critical Inquiry, The Skeptical Inquirer, and the Tuesday science section of The New York Times. The New York Review of Books, for example, recently (in November and December 1994 issues) included a series of articles, and a heated exchange, on the existence of, and evidence for, repressed memory syndrome. "Letters to the Editor" sections in journals such as Science and Nature provide summaries of on-going controversies. Sunday editions of most major newspapers can also point you in the direction of current controversies.

Controversies are also addressed in the disciplines in which you are studying. Proposed changes in, and the ensuing debate over, the Endangered Species Act will affect practices in forestry, biology and environmental science. Evidence concerning the possible harmful effects of technologies (from genetically altered plants and animals to high voltage power lines) and the liability of designers and engineers are topics taken up in many of your classes.

In her edited volume Controversy: The Politics of Technical Decisions (1984), Dorothy Nelkin identifies four general contexts in which controversies occur:

1) Efficiency Versus Equity. Local or community concerns with costs, benefits and justice. Examples include building or modifying airports, power plants, highways or landfills; environmental racism - building incinerators or landfills in impoverished and racially homogenous areas. Questions of efficiency and equity also occur on national levels regarding the funding of "big science" projects. For instance, what benefits does society get from "big science"? Couldn't the money be better spent elsewhere - on poverty programs for example? Examples include funding for the failed Superconducting Supercollider, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Human Genome project, the Hubble Space Telescope, a planned space station and a manned space mission to Mars.

2) Benefits Versus Risks. Fear of potential health and environmental hazards. Examples include nuclear waste disposal, use of growth hormones or synthetic drugs in making animals more productive, occupational health standards (e.g., with what chemicals can people work and for how long), damming, rerouting or using waterways for irrigation, the results of the human genome project or developing chemical weapons systems.

3) Regulation Versus Freedom of Choice. Restrictions of freedom of choice by the government. Supporters of government defend regulation; opponents want less government interference. Examples include lack of immediate availability of certain drugs (e.g., experimental AIDS or cancer treatments), federal risk assessment procedures, regulation of the Internet (e.g., what information can be posted [is hate speech permissible], intellectual property rights, federally mandated safety regulation on technologies, cars, powerlines, construction materials and methods, household technologies, environmental protection legislation and federally mandated immunization programs.

4) Science Versus Traditional Values. Controversies over research procedures and science education in the public schools. Examples include fetal tissue research, biomedical research (recombinant DNA), the use of animals in experiments, doctor assisted suicide, teaching Darwinian theory and/or current geological theories at the exclusion of teaching creationism and the problems, causes and effects of transferring technologies and methods produced by industrial countries to developing countries.

Here is a fifth context in which to examine controversies:

5) Science Versus Pseudo-Science. Controversies over whether certain phenomena actually exist and cause particular effects and the uses of empirical evidence to validate or invalidate given claims. Examples include debates over the existence of: the greenhouse effect, the efficacy of psychoanalysis, the methodological problems of studying other cultures (i.e. explaining Captain Cook's death at the hand of Hawaiian natives in the late 18th century), room temperature (cold) fusion, the rise of Satanism in the late 1980's, a relation between celestial phenomena and personal destiny, an afterlife as evidenced in near-death experiences, and repressed memory syndrome. Also included in this category are debates over scientific hoaxes such as Piltdown Man, N-Rays, evidence of "alien visitations" (e.g., crop circles) and a "missing link" in the fossil record.

Tips for Analyzing Controversies

Here are three steps in examining a contoversy;

1. determine the participants in the controversy and define their views about science and technology in the context of the debate;

2. analyze the arguments, evidence and terms presented by groups and individuals in the controversy;

3. evaluate, given your analysis, and draw conclusions about the positions presented in the controversy.

And some specific strategies and issues to consider:

Map out and identify the constituencies involved. What groups or individuals are participating in the controversy? What is the agenda of each of these groups? Do all the members of a certain group agree? About what issues do they disagree? Examples of constituencies include consumer advocacy and safety groups, unions, professional societies and associations, manufactures, lobbyists, scientists, engineers, educators, government representatives (on national and local levels) and the lay public.

Provide a history of the specific controversy - not a general history of the science or the technological artifact. When did the controversy arise? Under what circumstances? What other historical and social factors contributed to the controversy? Do the groups and individuals in the debate see and tell the history differently? What is significant about these differences?

Show how evidence is used to make a particular group or person's case. How is experimental evidence interpreted? Do groups and individuals interpret experimental results in the same way? Why or why not? How are statistics and polling data used? If experiments have been performed are they sound? Have experiments been replicated?

Analyze how technical communication and language is used. What types of documents make appearances in the debate? What role does technical jargon play? How are visual representations used? What role does the media play? How do the participants try to convince opponents, or one another? What rhetorical appeals (to, for example, freedom, choice, economic gain, expertise, truth, objectivity, democracy, autonomy, knowledge) are used in the debate?

Examine the use of experts in the controversy. Who are the experts? How did they achieve their expertise? Why should one listen to experts? Do experts agree? Can agreement among experts bring the controversy to a close?

Determine if the debate can be, or has, ended. Did overwhelming scientific evidence convince all of the participants? Can an experiment, or technological invention, bring a controversy to an end? How does a scientific or technological controversy achieve closure?

In selecting a topic, please keep in mind that the purpose of the report, and the individual chapters that comprise it, is to analyze an aspect of science and/or technology, which you define, in the context of the controversy. The purpose then is not to tell a story about the rise in reports about Satanic activity in the 1980's, for example, rather to show how science and/or technology shaped, or was shaped by, the aspects of the controversy about which you are reporting.

2. In 1850 Joseph Paxton built the Crystal Palace in London. The Crystal Palace was heralded as an unparalleled architectural and engineering achievement and stood as a symbol of the future of modern technology. The Paris World Fair in 1855, the Paris World Exhibition in 1878 and the Chicago World's Fair in 1933 included exhibits that predicted what effect science and technology would have on life in the future. Contemporary futurists like Alvin Tofler in Future Shock (see also the books mentioned in the overview) and futurist groups (e.g., The World Watch Institute have made less optimistic predictions of our future. Divide into groups of 3 to 5 students. Each group will research a world's fair futurist exhibit or contemporary future predictions. Groups will collaboratively author a short, informal essay analyzing visions of the future based on scientific and technological forecasts. In analyzing the success or failure of predictions in the exhibits, or the probable success of recent predictions, each group should consider what attitudes toward science and technology are demonstrated. In an informal oral presentation and class discussion, groups can compare and contrast the findings of their research in considering how participants in different historical eras come to view the promise and peril of science and technology.

3. In order to participate in social debates concerning science, technology and your professional and personal interests, you must learn to argue your case in a clear and incisive manner. You will prepare to debate the merits of a controversial issue regarding science and technology. The issues raised in this chapter will lend you a general framework with which to consider the issues, but no specific guidance. Here are a list of possible resolutions:

What passes for "science" these days is so big that it is better seen as a kind of transnational corporation than a knowledge producing enterprise.
Science and technology gain strength from having clear disciplinary boundaries.
Science can refute all criticism made about it from non-scientists.
Laypersons should regard the claims of the natural sciences and the social sciences in the same way.
Knowledge is powerful because only a few people have it.
Laypersons should/should not be involved in the process of determining science and technology policy on any level (national, state or local).
Critics of science and technology understand the nature of science and technology better than scientists and technologists do.
It takes a special psychological makeup to become a successful scientist or engineer.

Divide into groups of 4, 2 group members will take the affirmative side of the resolution, 2 group member the negative side. In typical debates (such as Oxford-style debates), resolutions are presented in somewhat vague terms. The opening move of debaters is to give the resolution a specific interpretation. The negative side must address that interpretation. Both sides should do their research and work collaboratively to lend the debate coherence. The affirmative side will have 20 minutes, the negative side 10 minutes for rebuttal, then 20 minutes to present their position, with 10 minutes for affirmative side's rebuttal. 15 minutes will be dedicated to unrehearsed questions from the audience. This exercise is designed to simulate the following features of real-world policy debates:

an audience uninformed about the issues, but potentially receptive to what you have to say;
a time constraint;
a need to take clear position that the audience understands.

The policy arena at the local, state and national levels has its own character which must be addressed by professional, but which is often lost on academics and classroom training. In lobbying to the public, government officials, or even official within the same industry you will need to integrate academic, journalistic and professional sources in analyzing the political agendas of science and technology and in constructing a persuasive argument.

An alternative to oral debates is to debate the same resolutions in a writing assignment. Split into groups of 4 with the one group presenting the affirmative argument, the other the rebuttal and negative argument and the affirmative group offering a conclusion.

Works Cited and Consulted

Barke, Richard. Science, Technology and Public Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986.

Chubin, Daryl. project director. Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade. Washington, DC: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Clinton, William and Gore, Albert. Technology for America's Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build Economic Strength. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Feyerabend, Paul. Science in a Free Society. London: New Left Books, 1978.

Fuller, Steve. Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.

Gude, Gilbert. project director. Expertise and Democratic Decisionmaking: A Reader. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.

Hollinger, David. "Free Enterprise and Free Inquiry." New Literary History 21: 897-919, 1990.

Nelkin, Dorothy. (ed.) The Language of Risk. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985.

Peterson, James D. (ed.) Citizen Participation in Science Policy. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984.

Rouse, Joseph. Knowledge and Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. Sassower, Raphael. Knowledge Without Expertise: On the Status of Scientists. Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.

Shrader-Frechette, K.S. Risk Analysis and Scientific Method. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.

Stigler, George. The Intellectual and the Marketplace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Journals that deal with science and technology policy issues:

Environment and Planning (Pion Ltd.)
Impact of Science on Society (Taylor & Francis Publishers)
Issues in Science & Technology (National Academy of Sciences)
Knowledge and Policy (JAI Press)
Science and Public Policy (Beech Tree Publishing)
Social Epistemology (Taylor & Francis Publishers)
Technological Forecasting and Social Change (Elsevier Science)

Other sources:

A Strategic Analysis of Science and Technology Policy. Harvey Averich. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.

Ethical Issues in Government. Norman Bowie ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981.

Ethics, the Social Sciences and Policy Analysis. Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings (eds.) New York: Plenum Press, 1983.

Technological Risk Assessment. C. Whipple et. al. eds., The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Nordoff, 1983.

Technologies and Society. Ron Westrum. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990.

The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policy Makers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.

The Social Shaping of Technology. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985.

1 John Studenmaier, Technology's Storytellers: Reweaving the Human Fabric (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).

2 The set of behavioral and institutional norms binding the actions of scientists is described by Robert K. Merton. See The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

3 See G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, "Putting Philosophy to Work: Karl Popper's Influence on Scientific Practice" (Philosophy of Social Sciences, 11, 1981), 389 - 407.

4 Research into the cognitive ability based upon gender has reached no consensus. See, for example, Diane Halpern, Sex Differences In Cognitive Abilities (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986).

5 Nathan Kaplan, Marcella H. Choy and John K. Whitmore, "Indochinese Refugee Families and Academic Achievement" (Scientific American, February 1992), 36-42.

6 This definition comes from Ricard Barke in Science, Technology and Public Policy. Wasington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986, p. 12.

7 Checkoway, Barry. "Public Hearings Are Not Enough." Citizen Partciaption. Vol, 1: 6-7, 1980.

8 Miller, Jon, Robert Suchner and Alan Voelker. Citizenship in an Age of Science. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 184.

9 K.S. Shrader-Frechette in Risk Analysis and Scientific Method (Boston: D. Reidel, 1985, p. 18) cites W, Lowrance, Of Acceptable Risk (Los Altos, CA: Kaufmann, 1976, 70-74) in her definition of 'risk' on which we have modified.

10 For greater detail on these classification see Chapter 2 of K.S. Shrader-Frechette's Risk Analysis and Scientific Method.

11 Clinton, William and Albert Gore. Technology for America's Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build Economic Strength. Washinton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 1.

12 "National Medals Are Pinned on 30 Scientists." The Washington Post. 15 Nov. 1990, p. A23.

13 For more detail on the function of OMB and other inerest groups on research funding see Chapter 3 of Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade. Daryl Chubin, project director, Washnigton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

14 See Chapter 4 of Richard Barke's Science, Technology and Public Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986.

15 See pages 25-26 of Richard Barke's Science, Technology and Public Policy. Washington, CD: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986.

16 From page 87 of Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade. Daryl Chubin, project director, Washnigton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

17 Numbers taked from Appendix B of Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade. Daryl Chubin, project director, Washnigton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

18 Ibid, page 90.

19 Details of this incident can be found Chapter 6 of David Dickson's The New Poliics of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

20 From Volume V pages 871-872, Report of the Presidental Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Washington, DC: 1986.

Participation and Policy
Chapter 7: Part 2

James H. Collier with David M. Toomey

Book Contents

Chapter 7: Part 2

Participation and Policy Chapter 7: Part 2

James H. Collier with David M. Toomey

Book Contents

Chapter 7: Part 2

Participation and Policy
Chapter 7: Part 2